Silk Road forums
Discussion => Silk Road discussion => Topic started by: Tommyhawk on November 29, 2011, 08:40 pm
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So, I've been having a lot of connection issues to the SR lately, and I'm sure a lot of you have also.
I found a simple fix that has made me able to connect to the SR and the forums 8/10 for the last 2 hours, versus the previous 0.5/10 times before.
I set up a relay.
Go to the Vidalia Control Panel and click the button that says "Setup Relaying".
Select the option that says "Relay Traffic inside the Tor network (non-exit relay). BE SURE TO CLICK THE NON-EXIT ONE. If you click the exit one you have potential of being identified by LE if any suspicious traffic goes through your connection that is in no relation to you. This can even lead to your house being searched if the right, 'bad' things go through it, so be careful not to misclick here.
I have my upload rates set to 25kb/s average and Maximum 30KB/s.
My internet isn't the fastest so I can't afford to have incredibly high upload rates.
By setting up a relay you are revealing nothing about yourself, and you are basically offering a little bit of your connection to make the Tor network more expansive and reliable.
Cheers. While this may not be a perfect fix, it sure is giving me better results than before. Remember, if you're having trouble connecting also, click the Use a New Identity Button in the Vidalia Control Panel.
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Keep in mind that when you run as a relay - even without being an exit node - your IP and assigned nick is published in real time, and permanent records are kept of it. The permanent records or for the 'ExoneraTor project, so if you are running as an exit and someone does something nasty, they can prove that you were running as an exit at that time, and the protocols you allowed to exit, protecting you somewhat from legal implications.
Current list of relays is here:
https://metrics.torproject.org/networkstatus.html
ExoneraTor can further find out whether this relay permitted exiting to a given server and/or TCP port. ExoneraTor learns about these facts from parsing the public relay lists and relay descriptors that are collected from the Tor directory authorities. The ExoneraTor info is here:
https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html
As well, you can search to see if an IP, fingerprint or nick was ever used as a relay at any given time with the Metrics Portal Relay Search, located here:
https://metrics.torproject.org/relay-search.html
Running Tor as a client leaves no trace and no one can tell you are, or were running a Tor client. As soon as you start running as a relay, you lose that anonymity, and leave a permanent record of your Tor relay history, including start and stop times, and exit policies if applicable.
Just a few things to keep in mind.
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Yeah, I mean as long as your not running as a relay.
On the Tor bundle - not the browser bundle but the vidalia bundle, they for the longest time had the default to not be a relay, then they changed it to be a relay, but no exit. Then they changed it to be a relay with exit by default. Now I think it's back to the default not being a relay again. Sigh.
Tor needs people to run as relays for the system to work. For the system to work, those folks running the relays should NOT also be people who need to take advantage of Tor in general usage.
For folks here, the best bet is still the Tor Browser Bundle. Extract it, use it, no install or config required. When an update comes out, you're notified on the first screen it defaults to loading. Simple and foolproof.
I've been messing with Tor since it came out about 7 years ago, and the quickest way to end up giving out info about your browsing habits with it is to fuck about with things you don't understand. Unless you've read the specs, the implementation docs, and follow the dev mailing lists and release blog daily, you should never fuck about with any of the settings or features.
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There's nothing illegal about using Tor or IP associated with it.
If you have feds or anyone trying to connect your IP to the silk road just because it was relay, then you have bigger problems. No one is going to have their eye on you unless you're currently being suspected of illegal activity, if that's the case, you shouldn't be doing any illegal business online. Common sense in my opinion.
For me, I run a registered(with the IRS) bitcoin exchange service allowing me to move money freely to auction sites from banks with no risk of suspicion, since I'm just providing a service. Bitcoins being the primary currency of the deep web, I sort of have an excuse to be on here.
As far as my nick, nobody can possibly link my name on here, or my IP that shows up on here with me in real life, or my location. So being a relay doesn't really put me as risk for anything. I think if my internet ip traffic is being looked at by someone who cares that I do drug business, then I have bigger problems. It wouldn't matter if my Ip was in a relay or not because clearly, somebody already suspects something.
I still think being a non-exit relay keeps you anoymas as far as your activity on the silk road. No body can pull your IP out of the relay and say you're accessing the silk road. The Tor Network is used by many people for just basic proxy purposes. Somebody might see your IP and think, hey this guy is just wanting to be annoymas on the web. But if someone is trying to connect you with the SR based on the notion that your IP is on here, you have bigger problems to the point it doesn't matter if your IP is on here. So in short, it doesn't really matter.
As long as you don't get caught browsing the SR on your computer, then you're straight.
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True enough Tommyhawk, nothing illegal at all with running a Tor relay.
It's all about lowering your exposure, and anticipating the worst.
If you're doing illegal things over Tor, why take the extra risk of leaving a record of the fact that you've been using Tor. Take Ene over at OVDB who's looking at 20 years for selling LSD. I fucking guarantee that the jury and the sentencing judge are going to hear about how Tor is used for illegal drugs and child porn, and if they can pull out reams of printouts showing he had a Tor relay running, well... They can't prove what the traffic was, but that middle age jury is just gonna hear Tor blah blah used for illegal stuff blah blah look at the records showing him using Tor blah blah running all the time blah blah...
And the 'nick' I referred to is the nickname that you pick when you set up your relay, or that it defaults to with your IP if you leave it blank.
Hang out in the Tor devs mailing list sometime, hell, ask Roger Dingledine or Mathew or ames, the three guys that created most the protocols and know more about how it works than any other people on earth. They'll tell you NEVER run a relay if you are using Tor for anonymity.
No, running a relay isn't going to get you caught. But if you're close to getting caught, it can be the probable cause they need to get enough to ensure you're caught. And I fucking guarantee you if that happens they'll start spouting stuff like 'Advanced technical encryption and communication to avoid capture' and act like they solved the Rosetta Stone to nail you, and that's enough to add serious time to your sentence because then they've nailed you as an advanced criminal operation using high tech methods, and moves you further the wrong way on the sentencing scale.
So it's not a case of will it get you caught, it's a case of if for some fucking stupid reason you get caught, or could be getting close to being caught, why leave a trail like a slug for them that can only hurt you in that situation.
Personally, I believe in doing everything possible to lower my exposure, and I put running a relay while doing illegal shit over Tor right up there with hiding your illegal shit in your mailbox. Actually, why the fuck not leave our illegal shit in the mailbox. Cause really, what are the chances the cops are gonna walk up and look in your mailbox, right? Zero. Absolutely fucking zero. And even with that zero chance, it's still a stupid idea.
Edit to add what took me under 5 minutes:
At the time of your post, there were 2,217 active relays.
Take out 417 exit nodes
Take out all nodes flagged as being capable of being guards, whether they have their guard flag set or not.
Take out all the chinese, german, and eastern european ones (Just a WAG there, could use other metrics)
Finally, take out all that offer 50+ kb/sec in bandwidth.
You are now the proud member of a group of 17 folks who have the relay profile you described in your first post.
I'm sure I could get it under 17 if I further narrowed it down by uptime.
All info available in the links I provided, and to anyone who cares to look.
Kinda makes ya' feel real safe, doesn't it.
Suggesting folks here run as a relay is bad advice, plain and simple, and defending the suggestion merely compounds your error.
Double edit: Of those 17, only 9 are in the US, and they're all in different states. If you've ever given out info about what state you're in, any swinging dick with 10 minutes and some Tor smarts can now go back through the records and pinpoint, fucking exactly, your IP you are running your relay on.
Triple edit: Basing uptime on when you said you started using a relay, and allowing 2 hours either way for a fudge factor precludes the need for you to have let anyone know what state you're in. (You can conveniently sort by uptime as well as bandwidth on the Tor metrics page.)
Try it yourself Tommyhawk, you just outed your own IP.
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...Running Tor as a client leaves no trace and no one can tell you are, or were running a Tor client....
It leaves no public trace, that's true. Although anyone who observes you connecting to Tor relays -- your ISP and, presumably, any "interested parties" who inquire of them -- will know you're interested in concealing *something*.
...As soon as you start running as a relay, you lose that anonymity, and leave a permanent record of your Tor relay history, including start and stop times, and exit policies if applicable....
But you gain plausible -- and *publicly documented* -- deniability. No one can say whether Tor traffic to/from your IP address was your doing or that of some one using your relay. So long as your relay was running at the time -- and the ports you connected to were allowed in your relay's exit policy (if any) -- you have *proof* that it could have been anybody.
To me, the bottom line is: Run as a client only; you *are* trying to hide something. Run as a relay; you're trying to help Chinese and Iranian dissidents.
I know which I'd rather admit to in court.
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...Running Tor as a client leaves no trace and no one can tell you are, or were running a Tor client....
It leaves no public trace, that's true. Although anyone who observes you connecting to Tor relays -- your ISP and, presumably, any "interested parties" who inquire of them -- will know you're interested in concealing *something*.
Connect through unpublished bridges - there's no record of them whatsoever.
I personally have an offshore (read non-extradition non-cooperating country) host that I've set up as a non-published bridge, and connect to Tor through that. Costs all of 8 bucks a month. Takes about 10 minutes to set up, and not even my ISP records will show that I've ever connected to a Tor entry point. It's indistinguishable from any other SSL traffic, and I use HTTPS-Everywhere, and shy away from any sites that don't offer SSL in this day and age.
There are simple instructions on the Tor blog about how to obtain an addy for an unpublished bridge if anyone doesn't have the technical wherewithal to set up their own on a cheap offshore host.
The more you know...
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Running a bridge will give you the plausible deniability of running a relay, without also putting you in the very easily acquired list of relay nodes that will leak more information than you'd like. It's also more helpful to users from repressive countries.
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There's two types of bridges: published, and unpublished.
Published bridges are the ones you set up to help dissidents in Iran and whatnot - the folks who administer the bridge lists will give you, I think, 3 bridge addresses if you send them an email from Gmail with Bridge List in the subject line. They also have a few other ways of spreading the info. They do this so that even if China or Iran tries to get the list, they can only get a few at a time. But while they aren't as easy to find out as hitting the Tor metrics page, don't count on it being private, otherwise those dissidents couldn't get on.
Unpublished bridges are identical, except you choose not to allow anyone you don't personally tell to know about it. Some groups ask folks to do this and give the relay addy directly to members of an affected group. Your ISP records will still show it connecting to known Tor relays, so if your goal is to completely hide your usage of Tor for complete deniability, then setting up a unpublished bridge on a cheap host will give you that.
Once again, it's all about lowering your exposure if you are engaging in activities that could result in loss of freedom. I've been to prison for the heinous crime of growing a plant, and it's not an experience I'd recommend to anyone.
Safety first, convenience of a site loading at your whim comes a far second to me.
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...I personally have an offshore (read non-extradition non-cooperating country) host that I've set up as a non-published bridge, and connect to Tor through that...
As should anyone who's more concerned with it being known *that* they use Tor, rather than *what* they're doing with it.
...not even my ISP records will show that I've ever connected to a Tor entry point....
Possibly not. Although "Research problems: Ten ways to discover Tor bridges" [ blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problems-ten-ways-discover-tor-bridges ] might cast doubt on that expectation.
...It's indistinguishable from any other SSL traffic...
I think distinguishability is what allowed Iran to achieve their most recent blockade of Tor traffic [ blog.torproject.org/blog/iran-blocks-tor-tor-releases-same-day-fix ]. The end of the article appears to indicate that the problem was purposely left partially unresolved.
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I've quoted from both those sources in another thread here somewhere.
The ten ways to discover bridges raises issues that don't apply to private, unpublished bridges.
It's worth noting that Iran could only do that because they had live access (normal logging wouldn't have revealed it, according to Roger Dingledine - full bore deep packet inspection was required, actually examining every packet flowing through the big-assed multi giga-bit Cisco routers) at two points to the data stream, one at the ISP, and a second one at the backbone peer connection. Even with that, Irans blockade lasted less than a day - the Tor devs had disguised Tor traffic as SSL traffic and used certs that expired in two hours. Several hours after the blockage was instituted they released a fix that changed the expiry times to be in line with 'normal' SSL certs. Iran didn't detect Tor traffic per se, but rather recognized the short-term certs were an anomaly that some, but not all, Tor traffic presented. The situation lasted for less than 24 hours.
But all that's getting waaay off the point, and the point is this: running a relay dramatically decreases your security and increases the chances that logged and mostly public information can come back and haunt you if you are ever faced with investigation. No, it won't be sufficient to start one, but anyone who does illegal shit and doesn't assume that someone, somewhere, is - or will someday be - investigating them, is playing a fools game.
Minimize risk, maximize freedom.
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Running a bridge will give you the plausible deniability of running a relay, without also putting you in the very easily acquired list of relay nodes...
The public relay list -- especially including Exonerator -- is key to documenting a plausible denial. A denial without proof is merely an assertion; I think it's safe to assume that's why Exonerator exists to begin with.
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Running a bridge will give you the plausible deniability of running a relay, without also putting you in the very easily acquired list of relay nodes...
The public relay list -- especially including Exonerator -- is key to documenting a plausible denial. A denial without proof is merely an assertion; I think it's safe to assume that's why Exonerator exists to begin with.
Bingo!
Tor was dying for exit relays (Did you know that well over 50% - closer to 80% at times, of Tor exit traffic goes through a few Tor-ran exit servers, with bandwidth from a few hundred megs/ sec up to a gig /sec each - they have a program you can donate to assist with this) so they came up with the ExoneraTor.
Say someone sends an email threatening to kill the president, and the secret service shows up at your house. "It wasn't me," you exclaim, "I was running a Tor relay."
With the ExoneraTor they can check and say yes, at 2:31 pm on Aug 4, CrunchyFrog was indeed running a Tor Relay with an exit policy allowing ports 587 and 2525 to forward email.
It doesn't prove you didn't do it, but it does prove that anyone else could also have done it, raising more than sufficient doubt that without solid corroborating evidence the matter would be dropped. It's still going to take up some of your time, and there's a good chance they'll seize your computer until they work the matter out. Best not to have anything on there you don't mind the states representatives pouring over.
Mind you, running an exit relay is an invite to getting a visit from officialdom at some point in time, eventually. It's not a case of if, but when. Running an exit relay if you're not as pure as the driven snow is just stupid. Most private exit relays are ran on rented hosts; the Tor blog has a good list of hosts that will put up with the complaints and takedown notices which will be forwarded to you to explain about exit relays to the complainants.
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FYI, I was denied access to a legitimate site for running a non-exit relay. It gave some error like "Sorry, your IP has been banned for being a part of the TOR network" or something. I had to force an IP change to be able to access it. Stupid jerks.